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The	process	of	European	integration	resulted	in	a	marked	increase	in	transnational	economic	
flows,	yet	regional	inequalities	along	many	developmental	indicators	remain.		We	analyze	the	
unevenness	of	European	economies	with	respect	to	the	embedding	of	export	sectors	in	
upstream	domestic	flows,	and	their	dependency	on	dominant	export	partners.		We	use	the	
WIOD	data	set	of	sectoral	flows	for	the	period	of	1995-2011	for	24	European	countries.		We	
found	that	East	European	economies	were	significantly	more	likely	to	experience	increasing	
unevenness	and	dependency	with	increasing	openness,	while	core	countries	of	Europe	managed	
to	decrease	their	unevenness	while	increasing	their	openness.		Nevertheless,	by	analyzing	the	
trajectories	of	changes	for	each	country,	we	see	that	East	European	countries	are	also	
experiencing	a	turning	point,	either	switching	to	a	path	similar	to	the	core,	or	to	a	retrograde	
path	with	decreasing	openness.		We	analyze	our	data	using	pooled	time	series	models	and	case	
studies	of	country	trajectories.		
	
Introduction	
The	economic	integration	of	EU	member	states	is	a	central	element	of	the	European	project,	where	the	
standardization	of	regulations,	a	customs	union,	the	removal	of	institutional	barriers	were	designed	to	
facilitate	the	emergence	of	a	larger	coherent	European	economic	unit	(Balassa	1962).	According	to	these	
expectations,	a	high-degree	of	economic	integration	eventually	erases	the	preferentiality	of	economic	
exchange	(along	lines	of	nationality,	language,	tradition).		Flows	will	reflect,	it	is	assumed,	only	the	
rationalities	of	space,	quality,	and	cost.			
The	European	process	of	economic	integration	did	result	in	an	increase	of	flows,	according	to	analyses	of	
bilateral	trade	data	and	other	aggregate	indicators	at	the	national	and	regional	levels	(Hoen	2002;	
Bergstrand	2008)	1.		This	is	particularly	evident	for	the	new	Eastern	countries:	with	the	removal	of	tariff	
and	non-tariff	barriers	liberating	the	movement	of	goods,	capital	and	services,	coupled	with	the	
prescribed	institutional	and	regulatory	harmonization,	flows	increased	greatly	between	the	economies	
																																								 																				
1	Although	there	is	an	overall	agreement	of	the	trade-creating	effects	of	economic	integration,	particularly	with	
respect	to	the	European	case	(e.g.	Bergstrand	2008),	conceptualizing	and	measuring	such	an	effect	is	not	a	trivial	
exercise.	Whether	comparing	intra-	and	extra-area	trade	or	extrapolated	pre-integration	data	with	actual	post-
integration	observations,	such	ex-post	assessments,	similar	to	pre-integration	assessments	of	would-be	effects,	are	
inherently		(Balassa	1967).	
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of	the	older	European	core	and	the	new	East	European	member	states.		East-European	economies	were	
not	only	connected	to	Core	markets,	but	sectors	from	the	East	became	integrated	into	European-wide	
production	structures	as	well.	
However,	the	European	project	is	not	only	about	the	economic	benefits	of	increasing	flows	–	better	
economies	of	scale,	employment,	higher	profits.	From	the	perspective	of	broader	developmental	
concerns,	increased	economic	transnationalism	might	preserve	or	even	amplify	deeper	inequalities.		
While	European	economies	are	becoming	increasingly	integrated	with	increased	transnational	flows,	
gaps	in	welfare,	wages,	factor	costs	and	value-added	productivity	that	separate	the	East	from	the	West	
seem	to	persist.			
One	interpretation	takes	the	lack	of	convergence	to	be	a	transient	phenomenon,	akin	to	a	Kuznets-curve	
of	economic	integration	where	“close	integration	is	good,	but	a	limited	move	towards	integration	might	
hurt”	(Krugman	1991:89).		A	second	interpretation	for	gaps	in	developmental	indicators	is	that	these	
stem	from	durable	core-periphery	relations.		According	to	this	view,	economic	integration	is	not	a	
source	of	increasing	equality,	but	rather	the	cause	of	structural	and	sectorial	imbalances.		As	integration	
increases,	economies	on	the	periphery	are	locked	into	vertical	trade,	foreign-dominated	consumer	
markets,	and	low	value-added	positions	in	the	global	chains	of	production	(e.g.	Oman	and	Wignaraja	
1991;	So	1990).	According	to	the	more	recent	version	of	this	argument,	adjusted	to	the	growing	
centrality	of	global	value	chains	(GVC)	in	the	new	Eastern	member	states,	a	new	type	of	dependent	
market	economy	(DME)	has	emerged	in	these	countries	with	the	headquarters	of	the	multinational	
firms	capitalizing	on	the	Eastern	cheap	and	highly	skilled	labor	and,	keeping	the	positions	of	firms	from	
these	countries	at	the	low	value	added	ends	of	the	production	chains.	Finally,	according	to	a	third	
interpretation,	exposed	also	in	the	introduction	to	the	special	issue,	the	new	member	states	
dramatically	differ	from	each	other	in	the	form	and	strengths	of	domestic	developmental	agency,	in	the	
capacity	of	domestic	public	and	private	actors	to	shape	developmental	paths	(Bohle	and	Greskovits	
2012;	Bruszt	et	al,	2015).	Based	on	this	third	approach	one	would	expect	diverging	developmental	
pathways	among	the	Eastern	member	states.	Empirical	research	thus	far	did	not	produce	decisive	
evidence	on	the	developmental	effects	of	the	spread	of	region-wide	production	chains	in	Europe	for	any	
of	the	above	the	arguments.			
We	fill	this	gap	in	this	paper.	Instead	of	measuring	underdevelopment	as	just	a	singular	dimension	of	the	
“not	there	yet”,	it	is	more	fruitful	to	analyze	pathways	–	divergent	and	path	dependent	processes	of	
institution	building	and	economic	development	–	that	European	peripheries	took	(Bohle	and	Greskovits	
2012).		Beyond	aggregate	statistics	and	overall	correlations	we	also	analyze	trajectories	of	European	
economies	to	find	evidence	for	convergence,	divergence,	or	durable	regional	inequality.		
A	key	form	of	inequality	in	economic	integration	stems	from	the	way	in	which	transnationally	integrated	
economic	activity	is	embedded	domestically.		A	risk	seen	in	increased	transnational	flows	is	the	
production	of	disembedding	(Scott	1997),	where	transnationalization	takes	the	form	of	cathedrals	in	the	
desert	(Hardy	1998):	places	of	transnational	production	increasingly	disconnected	from	domestic	
structures.		Research	about	the	diverse	ways	in	which	the	automotive	industry	became	integrated	on	
the	European	peripheries	indicate	that	the	depth	of	domestic	embedding	of	manufacturing	sectors,	such	
as	transport	equipment	manufacturing,	is	a	key	factor	in	the	success	of	economic	integration	(Bruszt	et	
al	2015).		Even	if	institutional	structures	are	congruent,	incongruent	supply	structures	in	Eastern	Europe	
might	block	the	success	of	transnational	integration	(Greskovits	2005).		
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Such	disembedding	can	lead	to	sustained	under-development	by	preventing	material	benefits	from	
transnational	participation	from	reaching	a	wider	part	of	the	economy.		If	an	economy	relies	on	export	
sectors	that	are	dis-embedded	from	the	domestic	sectoral	flows,	the	benefits	of	increased	exports	will	
be	limited	to	the	export	sectors	themselves,	leading	to	stagnation	in	other	sectors	and	resulting	in	
problems	of	economic	dualism	(e.g.	Singer	1970).		Disembedding	can	be	detrimental	by	blocking	ties	of	
learning,	both	of	know-how	related	to	production	processes,	and	both	of	knowledge	about	market	
opportunities	(Maya-Ambia	2011).		It	might	leave	an	economy	vulnerable	to	the	flight	of	capital	(as	
production	facilities	in	dis-embedded	sectors	might	be	more	easy	to	relocate),	and	it	might	also	lead	to	
the	strong	bargaining	position	of	industries	in	transnationally	embedded	sectors	(by,	for	example,	
credible	threats	of	relocation).		
In	this	article	we	analyze	the	process	of	European	economic	integration	along	two	main	dimensions:	
economic	openness	and	the	domestic	embedding	of	transnationalized	production.	We	also	analyze	the	
degree	of	trade	partner	concentration	of	export-oriented	sectors.	Our	empirical	approach	is	based	on	
input-output	tables	of	economic	sectors.		Our	basic	unit	of	analysis	is	a	European	economic	sector.		
Based	on	the	World	Input-Output	Data	project	we	use	data	on	flows	among	816	sectors	(34	sectors	in	
each	of	24	national	economies)	over	the	period	of	1995-2011.		We	develop	three	metrics:	transnational	
openness,	unevenness	in	the	domestic	upstream	embedding	of	export	sectors,	and	dependency	on	
dominant	export	partners.		We	relate	the	openness	of	European	economies	to	their	unevenness	in	
terms	of	sectoral	embedding	to	identify	how	increasing	openness	is	related	to	unevenness.		Our	analysis	
operates	at	three	levels:	at	the	level	of	particular	sectors,	at	the	level	of	national	economies,	and	at	the	
level	of	larger	regions.	
Our	first	measure	–	transnational	openness	–	captures,	for	each	country,	the	ratio	between	inter-
sectorial	value	flows	that	cross	the	national	borders	and	those	that	are	domestic.	Not	surprisingly,	the	
results	from	our	dataset	reflect	previous	assessments:	although	the	starting	points	differ,	the	national	
industrial	sectors	in	Europe	are	becoming	increasingly	more	connected	with	sectors	in	other	countries2.	
Our	second	measure	is	upstream	domestic	embedding	(defined	at	the	level	of	sectors),	and	the	uneven	
distribution	of	this	embedding	(defined	at	the	level	of	a	national	economy).		This	measure	captures	the	
difference	between	a	sector’s	share	of	total	exports	and	its	share	as	user	of	intermediate	domestic	
inputs.	This	allows	us	to	identify	sectors	that	are	significant	exporters,	but	are	weakly	embedded	in	
domestic	upstream	flows.		Coupling	this	with	the	share	of	sectorial	import	allow	us	to	identify	sectors	
that	are	“cathedrals	in	the	desert”	and,	through	the	distributional	variance	of	these	values,	to	see	the	
overall	unevenness	of	a	national	economy.	
Looking	beyond	domestic	production	structures,	our	third	metric	captures	sectorial	export-dependency	
in	terms	of	foreign	partner	concentration	of	sectors.	Primarily	associated	with	dependency	theory	and	
related	studies	on	the	developmental	effects	of	partner	concentration	(e.g.	Galtung	1971;	Dominguez	
1971;	Berman	1974;	Chan	1982),	the	topology	of	international	patterns	of	exchange	and	would-be	
monopolistic-oligopsonic	patterns	of	exchange	are	equally	relevant	to	understand	market	access	(e.g.	
Condliffe	1950:816;	Bauer	1954:103;	Meier	and	Baldwin	1957:332),	configurations	of	global	
commodity/value	chains	(Wallerstein	and	Hopkins	2000	[1985];	Porter	1987;	Gereffi	and	Korzeniewicz	
																																								 																				
2	Whereas	”economic	integration”	typically	refers	to	the	institutional	and	regulatory	processes	towards	(and	state	
of)	the	creation	of	a	common	market	(e.g.	Balassa	1962),	our	usage	of	the	term	refers	explicitly	to	cross-border	
economic	exchange.	
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1994)	and	the	interplay	between	such	topologies	and	development	(e.g.	Heintz	2006:515;	Appelbaum	et	
al	1994).	To	cater	for	the	differences	in	relative	sizes	between	countries,	our	measure	captures	the	
percentage-point	difference	between	the	largest	and	second-largest	shares	of	outflows	for	each	sector	
in	each	country	and	year.	We	apply	this	metric	on	those	industrial	sectors	identified	as	having	a	
significant	transnational	openness	(i.e.	our	first	metric).	
Our	findings	indicate	that	between	1995	and	2011	openness	increased	almost	monotonically	in	all	three	
regions:	The	Core,	the	GIPS	(Greece,	Ireland,	Portugal,	and	Spain),	and	the	East.		There	is	however	a	
difference	between	the	three	regions	in	terms	of	unevenness:	increasing	openness	was	paired	with	
decreasing	unevenness	in	the	Core,	while	more	openness	meant	more	unevenness	in	the	East.		The	GIPS	
region	was	highly	diverse	in	this	respect.		Dependency	shows	a	similar	pattern:	increasing	openness	in	
the	East	was	related	to	an	increase	in	dependency,	while	in	the	West	and	GIPS	countries	dependency	is	
not	a	function	of	openness.			
The	relationship	between	openness	and	dependency	shows	a	very	similar	pattern	to	the	relationship	
between	openness	and	unevenness.	For	the	Core	countries	there	is	no	evidence	for	increasing	
dependency	as	their	economies	are	becoming	more	open,	while	countries	in	the	East	show	a	significant	
trend:	more	openness	here	means	an	increase	in	sectoral	dependency	on	foreign	export	target	sectors.	
The	GIPS	region	shows	a	similar	trend	to	the	East	region,	but	this	trend	is	not	statistically	significant.	
Beyond	estimating	the	correlation	among	variables	of	openness,	unevenness,	and	dependency,	we	also	
analyzed	the	amount	of	change	(trajectories	of	temporal	volatility)	that	each	country	experienced.		Such	
trajectories	in	the	East	experienced	larger	changes,	than	in	the	Core.		At	the	level	of	national	economies,	
we	found	that	it	was	only	the	Core,	where	economies	were	able	to	increase	openness	and	decrease	
unevenness	at	the	same	time.		Trajectories	for	economies	in	the	GIPS	and	East	regions	were	much	more	
volatile.		We	found	two	distinct	kinds	of	trajectories	in	the	East:	turning	point	and	retrograde	
trajectories.		Turning	point	trajectories	were	able	to	reverse	the	trend	of	jointly	increasing	openness	and	
unevenness,	and	switch	onto	a	path	where	unevenness	decreases	with	further	increase	of	openness.		
Retrograde	trajectories	was	decrease	in	unevenness	only	when	openness	also	decreased.		Trajectories	in	
the	GIPS	region	show	the	most	volatility	of	all,	but	in	very	diverse	directions.	Greece	experienced	a	
dramatic	increase	in	unevenness	with	hardly	any	change	in	openness,	while	Ireland	shows	the	opposite	
pattern	–	a	drastic	increase	in	openness	with	a	modest	increase	in	unevenness.	
We	analyze	two	cases	from	each	of	the	three	regions	–	Germany	and	France	from	the	Core,	Greece	and	
Ireland	from	the	GIPS	region,	and	Hungary	and	Estonia	from	the	East.		The	case	studies	highlight	the	
usefulness	of	using	upstream	domestic	embedding	as	a	dimension	to	identify	sectors	that	are	most	
related	to	developmental	outcomes	in	a	national	economy.		
	
World	Input-Output	Data	
An	Input-Output	table	records	directional	valued	flows	between	(and	within)	industrial	sectors	or	
product	groups.	Derived	from	national	Supply-Use	tables	that	capture	the	supply	of	domestically	
produced	and	imported	goods	and	services	and	their	intermediate	use,	domestic	final	consumption	and	
exports,	a	national	Input-Output	table	–	see	Table	1	-	is	usually	a	balanced	account,	where	the	data	on	
5	
	
intra-	and	inter-sectorial	flows	(Z)	is	supplemented	with	imports	for	intermediate	(I)	and	final	use	(IFU),	
exports	(E),	domestic	final	use	(DFU)	and	various	value-added	categories	–	see	Table	1	below.	
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Table	1:	General	layout	of	a	national	Input-Output	table	(from	Timmer	2012,	p.	63)	
	
Apart	from	the	Input-Output	tables	produced	by	national	statistical	agencies,	there	are	several	data	
providers	that	compile	and	disseminate	standardized	national	Input-output	data	–	such	as	OECD,	
Eurostat	and	World	Bank.	The	data	used	in	this	chapter	is	taken	from	a	recent	project,	the	World	Input-
Output	Data	initiative	(WIOD	for	short)	(Timmer	2012;	Dietzenbacher	et	al	2013;	Timmer	et	al	2015).		
WIOD	is	a	multi-regional	dataset	that	merges	national	Input-Output	data	with	bilateral	trade	flow	
statistics.	It	contains	annual	Input-Output	data	for	343	sectors	between	1995-2011	for	40	countries	
(including	a	virtual	Rest-of-World	country),	out	of	which	27	are	EU	member	states	as	of	2012.			
Analyses	of	transnationalization	typically	relies	on	international	trade	data	that	is	recorded	at	the	level	
of	national	economies.		The	use	of	multi-regional	Input-Output	data	such	as	WIOD	allows	for	a	
decomposition	of	national	economies	into	their	constituent	sectors.		This	results	in	a	more	complex	
network:	for	example,	trade	flows	for	Europe	can	be	depicted	as	a	network	of	24	constituting	economies	
(Croatia,	Cyprus,	Luxemburg,	and	Malta	are	excluded	from	our	analysis	here	of	the	28	EU	countries	for	
their	missing	data,	small	size,	and	uniqueness).		European	economic	flows	can	also	be	depicted	as	flows	
among	816	sectors	(34	for	each	of	the	24	countries).		This	network	opens	the	possibility	to	address	
inequalities	between	economies	stemming	from	the	structure	of	flows	within	and	outside	countries	at	
the	sectoral	level.	
	
Our	article	uses	this	data	to	connect	domestic	sectoral	flows	(or	the	absence	of	domestic	flows)	to	
outside	flows	to	sectors	in	other	countries,	to	compare	openness	of	the	economy	and	the	domestic	
upstream	embeddedness	of	export	sectors.		As	our	questions	are	concerned	with	the	state	of	the	pan-
European	production	structures,	our	analysis	focuses	on	the	intermediate	use	sections	of	the	national	
Input-Output	tables	(Z	in	Table	1)	as	well	as	the	vector	of	cross-border	exports	(E)	and	imports	(I).	
Covering	annual	domestic	intra-	and	inter-sectorial	flows,	final	domestic	use	as	well	as	exports	and	
																																								 																				
3	WIOD	uses	a	sectorial	nomenclature	comprising	35	sectors,	but	as	there	is	no	data	on	intermediate	flows	for	the	
’Private	Households	with	Employed	Persons’	(c35)	sector,	this	sector	is	excluded	in	our	analyses.	
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imports	for	34	sectors	between	1995-2011,	the	data	covers	24	EU	countries	that	we	have	separated	into	
three	subsets:	Core	(Austria,	Belgium,	Germany,	Denmark,	Finland,	France,	Great	Britain,	Italy,	the	
Netherlands,	Sweden),	GIPS	(Greece,	Ireland,	Portugal,	Spain),	and	East	(Bulgaria,	Czech	Republic,	
Estonia,	Hungary,	Lithuania,	Latvia,	Poland,	Romania,	Slovakia,	Slovenia).	
	
Measuring	Openness	and	Unevenness	
We	develop	two	measures:		an	aggregate	index	of	openness	that	captures	the	extent	that	a	country’s	
economic	sectors	are	embedded	in	the	international	economy,	and	a	measure	of	upstream	domestic	
embeddedness	at	the	sectorial	as	well	as	aggregate	level	of	a	country.	The	notation	we	use	in	our	
formulas	below	refer	to	the	Input-Output	schematic	provided	in	Table	1	above.	
	
Openness	
The	first	aspect	of	a	national	economy	that	we	want	to	capture	is	to	what	extent	its	sectors	are	
embedded/interconnected	with	the	outside	(non-domestic)	economy.	From	the	perspective	of	an	
individual	economic	sector	within	a	country,	we	would	like	to	know	to	what	extent	this	sector	engages	
in	exchange	with	other	sectors	and	final	uses	within	the	national	borders	vis-à-vis	sectors	and	final	uses	
outside	the	country,	as	such	capturing	the	“neutrality”	of	national	borders.	
Among	the	different	metrics	that	exist	for	capturing	this	aspect	and	their	categorization	into	measures	
of,	respectively,	trade	volumes	and	trade	restrictions	(see	Yanikkaya	2003),	we	are	thus	interested	in	the	
former	type	of	measuring	the	openness	of	an	economy.	One,	if	not	the	most,	common	metric	is	the	
aptly	called	openness	index,	which	simply	reflects	the	share	of	total	imports	and	exports	divided	by	
gross	domestic	product.	However,	as	our	focus	is	on	the	level	of	economic	sectors	and	the	flows	to	and	
from	these,	we	replace	the	GDP	denominator	in	the	more	traditional	openness	index	with	the	sum	of	
domestic	sectorial	flows,	whether	for	intermediate	input	to	other	sectors	or	for	final	domestic	use	and	
consumption.		This	also	implies	that	our	metrics	are	self-contained,	only	using	data	as	obtained	from	the	
national	Input-Output	tables.	As	our	interest	lies	in	the	connectivity	between	different	sectors	and	as	
intra-sectorial	flows	reasonably	could	depend	on	the	fragmentation	and	size	of	industrial	units	and	
companies	within	a	sector,	we	consistently	exclude	intra-sectorial	flows	from	this,	as	well	as	the	other,	
metrics	in	our	study4.	
With	reference	to	the	various	parts	of	the	national	Input-Output	tables	(see	Table	1),	we	apply	a	
measure	of	economic	integration	–	openness	–	as	follows:	
!"#$$#%% = #' + )'*' + +,- / /',1
*
1,12'
*
' + 3,- 	
	
																																								 																				
4	The	magnitude	of	intra-sectoral	flows	might	be	influenced	strongly	by	concentration	of	firm	sizes.	If	a	sector	is	
represented	by	few,	or	only	one	large	firm,	intra-firm	flows	might	not	get	reported	to	statistical	agencies.		
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The	openness	for	a	particular	country	and	year	is	thus	calculated	by	summing	up	all	exports	and	imports,	
whether	for	intermediate	or	final	use,	and	subsequently	dividing	this	with	the	sum	of	all	domestic	
intermediate	and	final	use	flows.		
	
Sectorial	Upstream	domestic	embeddedness	(UDE)	
Whereas	the	above	metric	captures	the	extent	to	which	a	national	economy	and	its	economic	sectors	
are	embedded	in	international	production	structures,	the	usefulness	of	the	openness	index	proposed	
above	is	to	capture	a	state	of	economic	integration	at	an	aggregate	level.	Supplementing	this,	we	
propose	a	metric	that	captures	the	interplay	between	the	exports	of	a	sector	and	its	degree	of	its	
sourcing	of	domestic	intermediate	inputs.	We	operationalize	this	index	of	upstream	domestic	
embeddedness	(UDE)	for	a	sector	by	first	calculating	the	share	of	total	inter-sectorial5	domestic	inputs	
that	feeds	this	particular	sector,	subsequently	subtracting	the	share	of	total	exports	for	this	sector,	thus	
yielding	the	percentage-point	difference	between	shares	of	domestic	inter-sectorial	inputs	vis-à-vis	
foreign	exports.6	
-34' = /1,'51 /1,656,62151 − #'4	
	
The	UDE	of	a	sector	is	thus	calculated	as	the	difference	between	two	terms:	the	first	is	the	share	from	
domestic	upstream	flows	(the	sum	of	all	domestic	inflows	to	a	sector	from	all	other	domestic	sectors	
divided	by	the	total	sum	of	all	inter-sectorial	domestic	intermediate	flows).		The	second	term	is	the	
share	from	all	exports	(export	from	this	sector	divided	by	the	sum	of	all	exports).	
A	sector	with	a	negative	UDE	value	thus	means	that	its	share	of	total	exports	exceeds	its	share	as	a	
receiver	of	domestically	produced	inputs,	whereas	a	positive	UDE	value	indicates	the	inverse	
relationship.	We	can	thus	expect	that	the	economic	sectors	that	are	inherently	oriented	to	the	domestic	
intermediate	and	final	consumption	markets	(e.g.	construction,	utilities,	retail	sectors,	education	etc),	
have	positive	UDE	metrics.	Whereas	a	negative	UDE	value	indeed	indicates	a	sector	whose	significance	
as	an	exporter	exceeds	its	share	of	total	domestic	inputs,	a	better	understanding	of	the	particularities	of	
such	a	sector	has	to	take	foreign	sectorial	imports	into	account	as	well.	If	its	share	of	imports	are	
relatively	low,	its	high	share	of	total	export	values	(i.e.	negative	UDE	values)	would	reflect	a	value-
producing	sector	that	is	in	need	of	relatively	few	intermediate	inputs,	whether	domestic	or	foreign.	A	
sector	with	low	(negative)	upstream	domestic	embeddedness	with	a	relatively	high	share	of	foreign	
inputs	would	however	characterize	a	sector	that	merely	acts	as	a	link	to	transnational	production	
structures,	where	such	a	position	in	global	value	chains	evidently	is	not	dependent	on,	or	results	in	
																																								 																				
5	Similar	to	the	openness	index	and	based	on	the	same	reasons,	we	have	chosen	to	exclude	the	intra-sectorial	
flows	in	the	diagonal	of	the	Input-Output	tables.	
6	A	corresponding	index	for	downstream	domestic	embeddedness	is	conceivable,	i.e.	where	a	sector’s	share	of	
domestic	inter-sectorial	output	is	contrasted	with	its	share	of	imports.	In	agreement	with	the	contemporary	
literature	on	international	political	economy,	testing	such	a	corresponding	downstream	index	in	our	analysis,	we	
did	however	find	that	the	most	interesting	findings	stemmed	from	looking	at	exports	vis-à-vis	domestic	inputs,	i.e.	
reflecting	where	most	of	the	contemporary	literature	on	international	political	economy	and	world-system	analysis	
puts	its	focus.	
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fewer,	domestic	inter-sectorial	upstream	linkages.	To	capture	this	distinction,	the	country-sector	profiles	
we	provide	in	our	case	studies	below	combine	the	UDE	metrics	with	sectorial	shares	of,	respectively,	
total	exports	and	imports.	
	
Unevenness	
Although	a	near-zero	UDE	value	reflects	a	balance	between	a	sector’s	share	of	exports	and	share	of	total	
domestic	inter-sectorial	inputs,	it	is	to	be	expected	that	the	UDE	values	for	the	more	domestically	
oriented	economic	sectors	are	positive	across	all	the	board.	Similarly,	we	can	expect	certain	sector-
specific	biases	in	the	negative	UDE	values	that	we	find	for	more	export-oriented	sectors.7	
Acknowledging	such	sector-specific	characteristics	and	incorporating	the	sectorial	variance	we	can	
expect	from	this,	the	aggregate	(country-wide)	measure	of	integrational	unevenness	that	we	propose	
captures	this	variance	as	the	sum-of-squares	of	the	sectorial	UDE	values	–	see	formula	below.		
8$#9#$$#%% = -34':*' 	
Figure	2	below	depicts	an	example	economy	consisting	of	4	domestic	sectors	with	domestic	inter-
sectorial	flows	as	well	as	imports	and	exports	to	the	different	sectors.	Excluded	from	this	figure	are	
intra-sectorial	flows	as	well	as	domestic	value-added	and	flows	for	domestic	final	use.	The	openness	
measure	for	this	example	is	exactly	equal	to	one	(there	are	200	domestic	flows	and	200	outside	flows).	
With	an	aggregate	(country-wide)	UDE	value	of	.236,	the	corresponding	sectorial	UDE	values	are	found	
next	to	the	example	IO	table	below.	
	
	
	 C1	 C2	 C3	 C4	 Export	(E)	 	 UDE	
C1	 -	 0	 0	 0	 30	 	 -0.300	
C2	 0	 -	 25	 25	 50	 	 0.000	
C3	 0	 75	 -	 50	 20	 	 -0.075	
C4	 0	 25	 0	 -	 0	 	 0.375	
Import	(I)	 25	 0	 50	 25	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Figure	2:	Example	for	calculating	upstream	domestic	embedding	
In	this	example,	the	upstream	domestic	embeddedness	of	sector	C2	can	be	interpreted	as	“balanced”:	
with	half	of	total	inter-sectorial	inflows	going	to	C2,	this	is	matched	by	half	of	all	exports	originating	from	
C2.	Sector	C4	reflects	a	domestically	oriented	sector:	lacking	exports	in	this	example	data,	the	domestic	
intermediate	inflows	result	in	a	positive	UDE	index.	Finally,	sectors	C1	and	C3	have	negative	UDE	values,	
																																								 																				
7	Although	a	benchmark	approach	could	be	used	here,	i.e.	determining	an	average	sectorial	domestic/foreign	ratio	
using	all	countries	and	years	and	subsequently	adjusting	the	UDE	metric	to	this	benchmark,	we	preferred	allowing	
for	these	inherent	sectorial	properties	to	shine	through	in	our	results,	especially	as	our	interest	lies	in	longitudinal	
change.	
C2
C4C3
C1
25	(z2,4)
50	(z3,4)
25	(z4,2)
30	(e1)
50	(e2)
20	(e3)
25	(i1)
50	(i3)
25	(i4)
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implying	that	their	significance	as	exporters	exceed	their	significance	as	destinations	for	domestic	
inputs.	Whereas	C1	in	our	example	lacks	domestic	upstream	ties	altogether,	C3	does	have	upstream	
domestic	linkages.	Whereas	the	domestic	inputs	to	C3	represents	1/8	of	all	domestic	inter-sectorial	
inflows,	its	share	of	total	exports	is	slightly	higher	(1/5).	
Whereas	C1	in	this	example	constitutes	an	enclave	sector	–	a	cathedral	in	the	desert	–	the	above	
example	demonstrate	the	necessity	of	also	looking	at	sectorial	imports	for	drawing	such	conclusions.	As	
¼	of	all	sectorial	imports	goes	to	sector	C1,	this	indeed	indicates	a	sector	obtaining	intermediate	inputs	
from	foreign,	rather	than	domestic,	sources.	Similarly,	foreign	intermediate	inputs	to	C3	are	twice	that	
of	domestic	inputs,	which	also	has	to	be	taken	into	account	when	interpreting	the	state	of	the	sector.	
However,	if	the	sectorial	imports	to	C1	were	to	be	zero	in	our	example,	the	interpretation	of	its	role	in	
international	production	structures	would	be	somewhat	different:	it	could	then	possibly	indicate	a	
resource	node	at	the	top	of	the	global	streams	of	production	or	simply	a	self-sustained	“cornucopian”	
sector	that	produces	and	exports	value	without	needing	any	significant	inputs,	domestic	nor	foreign.	
	
Dependency	
Whereas	our	previous	metrics	examine	the	intermediate	(inter-sectoral)	flows	within	respective	national	
economy,	our	measure	of	dependency	measures	sectorial	export	partner	concentration.		A	national	
economy	experiences	higher	constraint,	if	the	export	from	its	sectors	is	concentrated.		We	measure	
concentration	by	the	relative	size	of	the	first	and	second	largest	export	partner	sector,	where	size	is	
measured	as	the	proportion	of	exports	leaving	the	source	sector.		If,	for	example	a	sector	exports	to	ten	
partners,	10%	of	all	exports	to	each,	then	our	dependency	variable	equals	zero.		This	variable	also	equals	
zero,	if	a	given	sector	exports	to	two	partners,	50%	of	all	exports	to	each.		In	both	of	these	situations	our	
source	sector	can	avoid	being	dependent	on	a	dominant	target	sector,	by	having	equal	size	alternative	
partner	sectors	to	ship	to.		If	however,	a	sector	exports	50%	of	its	output	to	one	target	sector,	and	the	
second	target	sector	takes	up	only	10%	of	exports	(and	the	remaining	40%	of	exports	goes	to	partners	
with	even	smaller	shares),	then	this	sector	is	dependent	on	a	major	target	partner.		We	calculate	
dependency	of	a	national	economy	as	the	mean	dependencies	of	sectors.		Sectoral	dependency	is	
measured	as	the	difference	between	the	largest	and	second	largest	normalized	export	element:	;#"#$;#$<= = >?@A(C)E>?@A(CFG)C@HG 5 	,		where			#′'1 = >@A>@ACAHG 	
Where	j	denotes	all	foreign	sectors,	in	every	foreign	economy.		
	
Openness	and	Unevenness	at	the	Regional	Level	
The	openness	of	European	economies	has	increased	considerably	from	the	mid-nineties	to	the	end	of	
the	first	decade	of	the	two	thousands.		Figure	3	shows	the	trends	of	our	sectoral	openness	score	by	
three	regions.		All	three	regions	–	the	European	core,	the	GIPS	countries	on	the	Western	and	Southern	
periphery,	and	countries	in	the	East	–	followed	the	same	basic	trajectory:	From	an	openness	score	of	
about	1	in	1995	(where	the	size	of	exports	plus	imports	is	the	same	as	the	amount	of	domestic	inter-
sectors	flows)	all	three	regions	reached	an	openness	score	of	about	1.5	by	2011	(with	outside	flows	50%	
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larger	than	domestic	flows).		The	two	peripheral	regions	(GIPS	and	East)	were	slightly	more	open	
throughout,	and	the	2009	crisis	shows	up	as	a	drop	in	the	openness	of	all	regions,	but	the	overall	trend	
is	increasing	openness.		
	
	
Figure	3:	Mean	openness	of	sectoral	flows	for	three	European	regions	between	1995	and	2011.	
	
While	there	is	no	difference	in	openness	across	regions,	is	there	a	difference	in	unevenness?		Our	
hypothesis	is	that	it	is	not	the	extent	of	openness	that	distinguishes	the	European	Core	from	its	
peripheries,	but	the	domestic	embedding	of	export	sectors.		In	other	words,	it	is	the	Core	that	has	the	
capacity	to	benefit	from	this	increased	openness	through	the	indirect	increase	in	demand	for	the	
outputs	of	sectors	feeding	the	export	sectors.		
How	much	does	an	increase	in	openness	go	together	with	an	increase	in	unevenness?		To	estimate	the	
overall	relationship,	we	pool	our	country-year	observations,	where	each	country-year	data	point	has	a	
value	for	openness,	and	also	a	value	for	unevenness.		This	pooled	time	series	dataset	consists	of	408	
observations:	one	for	each	of	the	17	years	for	the	24	countries.		We	use	this	pooled	data	to	estimate	a	
simple	regression	slope	for	each	of	the	three	regions.		The	results	are	visualized	below	on	Figure	4.		
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Panel	1:	all	three	regions	 Panel	2:	Core	and	East	regions	
	
Figure	4:	Openness	and	unevenness	by	regions,	with	bivariate	linear	regression	predicted	values.	
	
The	first	panel	of	Figure	4	shows	all	three	regions.		A	group	of	outlier	data	points	with	high	unevenness	
and	relatively	low	openness	stands	out:	these	are	data	points	for	Greece	–	the	most	extreme	case	of	
unevenness	in	terms	of	the	lack	of	upstream	domestic	embedding	of	export	sectors.		Another	group	of	
outlier	data	points	are	to	the	right:	with	less	extreme	values	of	unevenness,	but	very	high	values	of	
openness.		These	points	represent	Ireland:	one	of	the	most	open	national	economies	in	the	world.	(We	
will	discuss	the	trajectory	of	Greece	and	Ireland	in	detail	later.)		The	regression	slopes	vary:	for	the	Core	
and	GIPS	region	the	slope	is	negative:	more	openness	results	in	less	unevenness.		The	predicted	line	for	
the	East	has	a	positive	slope:	more	openness	means	more	unevenness	here.		The	second	panel	only	
shows	the	Core	and	East	data	points.		At	higher	levels	of	openness	(above	.80)	the	difference	between	
the	unevenness	of	Core	and	East	economies	becomes	dramatic.		However,	there	is	considerable	
scattering	in	the	data,	and	the	variance	of	unevenness	explained	by	openness	is	26%	for	the	best	fitting	
region	(the	Core).			
To	test	the	statistical	significance	of	the	difference	in	the	way	openness	is	related	to	unevenness	across	
the	three	regions	we	study,	we	employ	a	pooled	time	series	regression	model.		The	dependent	variable	
is	unevenness,	and	the	independent	variables	represent	regions,	and	the	varying	slopes	of	openness	
within	regions;	plus	controls.		The	first	variable	that	we	include	is	Openness,	to	control	for	an	overall	
slope	between	openness	and	unevenness.		We	control	for	a	simple	trend	in	unevenness	by	including	a	
Year	variable,	which	is	equal	to	one	for	1995,	and	goes	to	17.		We	include	an	interaction	between	year	
and	openness	to	test	for	a	changing	overall	relationship	between	openness	and	unevenness.		We	add	
the	total	size	of	sectoral	flows	to	represent	the	size	of	the	economy	(in	thousand	billion	US	dollars).		
Larger	economies	might	be	less	uneven,	and	for	small	economies	unevenness	might	be	a	greater	risk.		
We	include	binary	indicators	for	the	three	regions	–	the	model	includes	GIPS	and	East	regions	as	
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predictors,	and	the	Core	region	as	the	omitted	category.		We	then	include	interactions	between	the	
region	indicators	and	openness	–	these	are	the	variables	that	we	are	really	interested	in.		We	include	a	
GIPS	*	Openness	and	an	East	*	Openness	interaction,	and	the	Core	is	again	the	omitted	category.		We	
ran	an	ordinary	least	squares	model,	but	computed	one-sided	p-values	using	a	permutation	test8.			
	
 Unevenness	*	100	
Independents:	 B	 beta	 p-value	
Intercept	 7.656	
	
.052	
Openness	 -4.420	 -.327 .010	
Year	 0.168	 .253	 .001	
Year	*	Openness	 -0.161	 -.201	 .119	
Size	 -0.486	 -.219	 .001	
Region	 	 	 	
GIPS	 2.054	 .235	 .002	
East	 -5.709	 -.863	 .000	
Region	interactions	 	 	 	
GIPS	*	Openness	 3.741	 .291	 .019	
East	*	Openness	 8.280	 .867	 .000	
N	 408	
  Adj.	R-square	 .336	
F	 26.815	   
p-value	 .000	   
Replications	 10	000	   
	 	
a:	regression	coefficients	 b:	marginal	effects	plot	
	
Table	2:	Pooled	time	series	regression	model	predicting	unevenness.	
	
The	model	shown	on	panel	a	of	table	2	indicates	that	overall	openness	is	negatively	related	with	
unevenness.		There	is	a	significant	time	trend:	unevenness	increases	for	the	entire	set	of	European	
economies	with	time.		We	did	not	find	evidence	for	a	changing	relationship	between	openness	and	
unevenness	with	time	(the	interaction	between	time	and	openness	is	not	significant).		Turning	to	
regions,	the	initial	level	of	unevenness	in	the	East	is	below	both	the	level	of	unevenness	in	the	Core	and	
in	the	GIPS	countries.	(This	finding	is	confirmed	by	a	simple	analysis	of	variance	for	unevenness	across	
regions;	with	p<.050.)		Our	pooled	time	series	model	indicates	that	the	relationship	between	openness	
in	the	East	is	significantly	different	from	the	same	relationship	in	the	Core	region.		In	the	East	region	
more	openness	means	more	unevenness,	at	the	p=.000	level	of	significance.		We	visualize	the	predicted	
levels	of	unevenness	by	region	on	panel	b	of	Table	2.	This	marginal	effects	plot	shows	the	predicted	
values	of	unevenness	at	various	levels	of	openness	by	region,	while	all	other	variables	are	kept	constant	
at	their	mean	values.	The	positive	relationship	between	openness	and	unevenness	is	specific	to	the	East	
region	only.		The	differences	between	the	regions	in	the	way	openness	relates	to	unevenness	is	not	due	
to	the	overall	trend	of	increasing	openness,	or	the	size	of	economies,	or	simple	random	noise.		National	
																																								 																				
8	Permutations	tests	for	the	p-values	of	coefficients	is	especially	appropriate	since	the	observations	are	not	drawn	
as	a	sample	from	a	large	population,	but	represent	all	cases	–	all	the	country	years	in	the	period	we	consider	(Good	
2006).		
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economies	in	the	East	are	becoming	more	uneven	with	increasing	openness,	compared	to	Core	
economies.		
	
Openness	and	Dependency	
After	showing	evidence	for	the	regional	differences	in	how	openness	is	related	to	unevenness,	we	
analyze	similar	relationships	regarding	dependency.		As	economies	in	the	East	are	becoming	more	
uneven,	are	they	also	becoming	more	dependent	as	well?	To	answer	this	question,	we	constructed	the	
same	regression	model	that	we	used	for	unevenness.		The	dependent	variable	here	is	dependency	–	the	
mean	difference	between	the	largest	and	second	largest	export	partner	for	domestic	sectors.		The	
independent	variables	are	the	same:	Openness,	Year,	an	interaction	term	between	Openness	and	Year,	
the	overall	Size	of	the	economy,	and	indicators	of	the	three	regions,	plus	interactions	between	Region	
and	Openness.		Here,	again,	standard	errors	are	estimated	by	a	permutation	test.	
	
 Dependency	*	100	
Independents:	 B	 beta	 p-value	
Intercept	 1.532	
	
.110	
Openness	 4.441	 .301 .001	
Year	 0.493	 .677	 .000	
Year	*	Openness	 -0.511	 -.582	 .000	
Size	 -0.699	 -.288	 .000	
Region	 	 	 	
GIPS	 -.227	 -.024	 .425	
East	 -1.808	 -.250	 .107	
Region	interactions	 	 	 	
GIPS	*	Openness	 2.138	 .152	 .140	
East	*	Openness	 4.923	 .471	 .013	
N	 408	
  Adj.	R-square	 .281	
F	 29.980	   
p-value	 .000	   
Replications	 10	000	   
	 	
a:	regression	coefficients	 b:	marginal	effects	plot	
	
Table	3:	Pooled	time	series	regression	model	predicting	dependency.	
	
	
As	the	first	panel	of	Table	3	shows,	dependency	of	an	economy	is	positively	related	to	its	Openness;	
dependency	increases	with	time,	but	the	impact	of	Openness	on	dependency	is	mitigated	with	time.		
Larger	economies	are	less	dependent	on	average.		Regional	difference	is	only	manifest	in	the	added	
impact	of	Openness	on	Dependency	in	the	East.		The	second	panel	of	Table	3	shows	the	differences	in	
how	Openness	is	related	to	Dependency,	by	regions.		For	clarity,	the	GIPS	region	is	omitted	(it	falls	
between	the	fitted	lines	of	East	and	West).		The	marginal	effects	plot	–	keeping	all	independent	variables	
but	Openness	constant	at	their	means	–	shows	that	there	is	no	significant	relationship	between	
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openness	and	dependency	in	the	West,	while	in	the	East	increase	in	openness	goes	together	with	
increase	in	dependency.		The	GIPS	region	shows	a	pattern	that	is	in	between	the	Core	and	East.		The	
trend	in	the	GIPS	region	is	similar	to	the	East	–	more	openness	goes	together	with	more	dependency.	
However,	this	trend	is	not	statistically	significant	(p=.140),	but	the	sign	is	positive.		
	
Openness	and	Unevenness	by	Countries	
After	analyzing	openness	and	unevenness	at	the	level	of	regions,	now	we	analyze	this	relationship	at	the	
level	of	national	economies.		Openness	increases	in	all	three	regions,	and	openness	related	differently	to	
unevenness	within	regions.		Now	we	turn	to	the	variation	at	the	level	of	national	economies.		As	Figure	5	
shows,	the	general	tendency	is	increasing	openness	for	all	but	two	of	the	24	economies.		Countries	in	
the	Core	region	are	relatively	bounded	in	their	increase	of	openness,	with	increase	in	the	5%	-	25%	
range.		The	East	and	the	GIPS	regions	are	more	diverse.		In	the	GIPS	region	the	openness	of	Ireland	
increased	dramatically,	by	50%.	In	Portugal,	Spain	and	Greece	the	increase	in	openness	is	below	
European	average	of	0.161	(16.1%	higher	openness	in	2011	over	1995).	The	highest	increase	in	
openness	was	in	Hungary:	a	67%	increase.		There	are	only	two	countries,	Estonia	and	Latvia,	where	the	
openness	in	2011	is	less	than	the	openness	in	1995.		Unevenness	(shown	on	the	secondary	axis)	varies	
more	than	openness.		Some	countries	experienced	a	decrease	in	unevenness,	while	some	(especially	
Greece)	saw	major	increase.		
	
	
Figure	5:	Relative	change	in	openness	and	unevenness	for	national	economies	between	1995	and	2011.		
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To	compare	countries	by	the	tradeoffs	between	openness	and	unevenness,	we	computed	regression	
slopes	for	each	country.		While	in	the	previous	section	we	estimated	the	differences	in	the	openness-
unevenness	association	by	region,	here	we	do	so	at	the	country	level.		As	the	datasets	become	small	(17	
observation	in	each	case),	we	only	use	bivariate	models.		We	test	for	the	significance	of	the	slope	
coefficient	using	a	permutation	test	again,	especially	appropriate	for	small	samples.		The	results	of	the	
regression	estimates	are	presented	in	Figure	6.		
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Figure	6:	Regression	slopes	(B	coefficients)	for	predicting	unevenness	based	on	openness.	Light	shading	
indicate	statistically	insignificant	slopes	(p>.010).	
	
Negative	slope	coefficients	mean	that	when	the	openness	of	an	economy	increases,	the	unevenness	
decreases.		In	such	countries	the	increase	of	exports,	for	example,	is	located	in	sectors	that	are	already	
well	embedded	in	domestic	upstream	flows.		A	positive	slope	means	that	when	the	openness	of	that	
economy	increases,	unevenness	also	increases.		In	such	an	economy,	for	example,	sectors	that	increase	
their	exports	are	disembedded	from	the	domestic	inter-sectoral	flows.		
Figure	6	shows	that	the	three	economic	regions	are	not	homogenous,	nevertheless,	the	overall	
differences	among	regions	seen	before	are	manifest	in	the	country	breakdown	as	well.		The	most	
important	inequality	is	between	the	Core	countries	and	the	countries	in	the	East:		Four	of	the	core	
countries	(Sweden,	Germany,	Great	Britain,	and	Austria)	show	a	significant	negative	relationship	
between	openness	and	unevenness,	while	none	of	the	East	countries	have	a	significant	negative	
coefficient.		(Only	one	none-core	country	has	a	negative	coefficient:	Spain.)		What	this	indicates	is	that	
several	core	countries	have	increased	their	openness	in	a	way	that	benefits	domestic	upstream	
embedding	of	their	sectors,	while	there	is	evidence	for	the	opposite	trend	in	the	East.		We	find	five	
economies	in	the	East	(Poland,	Slovenia,	Hungary,	Estonia,	and	Czech	Republic)	where	an	increase	in	
openness	means	dis-embedding	from	domestic	upstream	flows.		
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Structural	benefits	of	increasing	openness	seem	to	accumulate	in	the	Core.	But	these	benefits	are	not	
experienced	by	all	core	economies:	there	are	four	of	them	(Netherlands,	Italy,	France,	and	Finland)	
where	openness	brings	unevenness	(domestic	dis-embedding).		
	
	
Trajectories	
Up	to	this	point	we	considered	only	incremental	(annual)	change,	or	overall	change	from	1995	to	2011.		
In	this	section	we	consider	the	shape	of	trajectories	that	economies	traveled	in	the	space	of	openness	
and	unevenness.		As	our	initial	motivation	was	to	distinguish	between	transient	and	durable	inequalities,	
we	need	to	know	the	historical	shape	of	changes.		We	construct	trajectories	charts	for	each	country	
aggregating	our	data	into	three	year	periods	for	smoothing.	We	argue	that	the	concept	of	trajectory	is	
especially	relevant	to	understand	economic	development	in	the	space	of	openness	and	unevenness.		
While	in	the	previous	analyses	we	were	identifying	overall	linear	trends,	here	we	are	interested	in	non-
linear	developmental	paths	that	are	specific	to	individual	countries,	or	types	of	countries.		Our	trajectory	
charts	show	the	traces	for	each	country	colored	by	the	slope	of	the	trajectory.		A	red	line	indicates	that	
the	trajectory	follows	a	statistically	significant	positive	linear	trend	(unevenness	increases	with	
openness).		A	blue	trajectory	has	a	significant	negative	trend,	while	a	grey	trajectory	has	no	significant	
linear	trend.	
	
The	Core	
Figure	7	presents	the	trajectories	of	countries	in	the	space	of	openness	and	unevenness	from	1995	to	
2011.		Great	Britain,	Germany,	Sweden,	and	Austria	have	significant	negative	slopes:	their	unevenness	
decreases	with	increasing	openness.		Of	the	trajectories	in	the	Core,	it	is	Germany	that	shows	the	
longest	distance	traversed	–	the	greatest	increase	in	openness,	and	the	greatest	corresponding	decrease	
in	unevenness.			
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Note:	Color	indicates	slope:	Blue	hues:	significant	negative	slope;	Gray:	insignificant	slope;	Red	hues:	significant	positive	slope.	
Figure	7:	Core	country	trajectories	in	the	space	of	openness	and	unevenness.		
	
Germany	
What	happened	in	the	German	economy	that	explains	the	increase	in	openness	that	at	the	same	time	
decreased	unevenness?		To	understand	this,	we	analyze	the	starting	and	ending	point	of	this	trajectory	
at	the	level	of	particular	German	sectors.		Figure	8	shows	German	sectors	in	1995	and	in	2011,	ranked	by	
their	upstream	domestic	embedding.		For	each	sector	we	also	show	the	export	share	and	the	import	
share	(the	proportion	of	the	economy’s	imports	and	exports	that	happened	in	that	sector).		Sectors	at	
the	left	have	the	lowest	values	of	domestic	upstream	embeddedness,	and	sectors	on	the	right	have	the	
highest	values.		An	economy	where	the	line	representing	upstream	domestic	embedding	is	completely	
flat	is	an	economy	that	is	perfectly	balanced:	for	every	sector	the	share	in	exports	is	the	same	as	the	
share	in	domestic	intermediate	inputs.		This	line	for	Germany	in	1995	is	not	flat:	on	the	left	hand	side	
the	transport	equipment	sector	has	the	highest	negative	value:	-0.128.		This	means	that	the	share	of	this	
sector	in	the	total	domestic	inter-sectoral	flows	(0.058,	or	5.8%)	is	0.128	less	than	the	proportion	of	all	
German	exports	that	is	located	in	this	sector	(0.186,	or	18.6%).		On	the	right	end	of	the	chart	there	is	the	
construction	sector,	with	a	positive	upstream	embeddedness	score.	The	construction	industry	
consumed	11%	(0.110)	of	domestic	inter-sectoral	flows,	while	its	export	share	was	only	0.3%	(0.003).		
Thus	its’	UDE	score	is	0.107.		For	the	following	case	studies	we	present	only	the	bottom	five	sectors	in	
the	ranking	by	upstream	domestic	embeddedness	–	the	most	dis-embedded	export	sectors.		
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Figure	8:	German	sectors	in	1995,	ranked	by	upstream	domestic	embedding	(UDE).	
	
As	we	have	seen	on	the	chart	of	Core	country	trajectories,	Germany’s	openness	steadily	increased	from	
1995	to	2011,	while	its	unevenness	has	decreased.		Comparing	the	sectoral	breakdowns	from	1995	and	
2011	there	is	no	apparent	radical	difference	at	first	sight.		The	charts	tell	of	important	changes	though:	
key	sectors	increased	both	their	openness	(mostly	import	shares),	and	both	their	domestic	intermediate	
inputs	–	their	upstream	embedding.			
The	key	example	is	the	leading	sector	of	Germany,	the	transport	equipment	manufacturing	sector.		This	
sector	has	increased	its	export	share	between	1995	and	2011	from	18.6%	to	19.5%,	while	it	also	
increased	its	share	from	domestic	sectoral	inputs	from	5.8%	to	9.2%.		Even	though	this	period	saw	a	
great	increase	in	the	foreign	production	and	value	added	component	in	this	sector,	there	was	a	great	
increase	in	German	inputs	as	well.		The	inputs	of	the	German	metallurgy	sector	(the	largest	domestic	
supplier)	to	the	transport	equipment	sector	increased	by	143.1%,	while	the	overall	increase	of	the	
German	economy	(measured	in	total	flows)	was	47.9%.		Supplies	from	the	renting	sector	has	increased	
by	244.0%	(reflecting	the	major	increase	in	the	practice	of	relying	on	rented	equipment	in	industry).		
Flows	from	German	wholesale	increased	by	107.4%.		
Similar	trends	can	be	observed	in	the	other	major	German	sectors	as	well:	machinery,	electronics,	
chemical,	and	metallurgy	sectors.		The	machinery	sector	increased	its	inputs	from	domestic	metallurgy	
by	97.5%,	from	renting	by	123.4%.		The	metallurgy	sector	increased	inputs	from	renting	by	102.2%,	from	
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utilities	by	74.7%.	In	sum,	the	German	economy	managed	to	both	increase	its	production	abroad,	and	to	
increase	its	reliance	on	domestic	sectors.		Why	and	how	this	was	possible	is	a	question	outside	the	
scope	of	this	article	–	but	one	might	guess	that	technological	change	(the	increasing	significance	of	
powdered	metals),	labor	policy	(pacts	to	curb	domestic	wage	increase),	and	dependence	on	high	quality	
specific	inputs	might	constitute	parts	of	the	causes.		
	
France	
The	trajectory	of	France	is	orthogonal	to	the	German	trajectory:	the	French	economy	has	been	
becoming	more	open,	but	it	has	also	became	more	uneven	in	the	process.		The	charts	on	Figure	9	show	
the	five	sectors	with	the	least	domestic	upstream	embeddedness	in	1995	and	in	2011.	(For	the	sake	of	
saving	space	we	use	only	the	most	disembedded	five	sectors	for	this	and	following	country	cases.)		The	
chart	from	1995	looks	very	similar	to	the	same	chart	from	Germany	–	with	the	same	sectors,	and	with	
slightly	smaller	negative	values	for	embeddedness.		By	2011	the	list	and	order	of	these	top	five	sectors	
remain	the	same,	with	an	increased	dis-embedding.	
	 	
Figure	9:	French	sectors	in	1995	and	2001,	bottom	five	sectors,	ranked	by	upstream	domestic	
embedding	(UDE).	
	
Similar	to	Germany,	the	sector	with	the	largest	share	of	exports	is	the	transport	equipment	sector.		In	
1995	this	sector	was	responsible	for	15.7%	of	all	exports,	while	it	used	6.1%	of	domestic	intermediate	
flows.		In	2011	the	export	share	of	the	export	share	of	this	sector	increased	to	18.5%,	while	the	share	in	
domestic	upstream	decreased	to	5.3%.		The	composition	of	domestic	inputs	to	the	transport	equipment	
sector	changed	little	–	with	equipment	renting,	metallurgy	wholesale,	and	electrical	equipment	sectors	
being	the	top	suppliers.		
The	second	largest	sector,	chemicals	shows	a	similar	pattern:			its	export	share	increased	from	12.3%	to	
14.9%,	while	the	share	from	domestic	inputs	increase	at	a	slower	rate	(from	3.8%	to	4.8%).		There	was	
practically	no	change	in	the	outside	and	inside	flows	of	the	other	sectors	in	the	top	list	(electrical,	
machinery,	and	metallurgy).		Overall,	it	seems	that	France	was	not	able	to	involve	domestic	supply	
sectors	into	the	process	of	increasing	transnationalization	in	the	same	way	that	Germany	was	able	to	
accomplish.		
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Trajectories	in	the	GIPS	countries	
Figure	10	shows	the	country	trajectories	in	the	space	of	openness	and	unevenness	for	the	GIPS	
countries.		Greece	is	a	clear	outlier	in	its	extreme	increase	in	unevenness,	with	only	a	moderate	increase	
in	openness.		Ireland	is	the	opposite	of	the	Greek	story	–	outstanding	increase	in	openness	with	only	
moderate	levels	of	unevenness.			
	
Greece	
The	Greek	economy	in	1995	was	not	significantly	more	uneven	than	the	German	economy	in	the	same	
year	(Greek	unevenness	was	0.083,	German	unevenness	was	0.071).		By	the	end	of	the	time	period	we	
study	the	Greek	economy	became	the	most	uneven	(unevenness	=	0.204),	while	Germany’s	unevenness	
decreased	to	0.047.		What	happened?	
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Note:	Color	indicates	slope:	Blue	hues:	significant	negative	slope;	Gray:	insignificant	slope;	Red	hues:	significant	positive	slope.		
The	area	outlined	by	dashed	grey	rectangle	represents	the	area	covered	by	the	Core	and	East	trajectories	charts.		
Figure	10:	GIPS	country	trajectories	in	the	space	of	openness	and	unevenness.		
	
The	sectoral	breakdown	of	the	Greek	economy	is	presented	on	Figure	11.		In	1995	the	moderate	level	of	
unevenness	in	upstream	domestic	embedding	was	chiefly	due	to	water	transport,	textiles,	agriculture	
and	metallurgy.		In	this	year	water	transport	was	responsible	for	16.0%	of	exports,	textiles	and	
agriculture	represented	about	12%	of	exports	each,	and	metallurgy	was	8.6%.		By	2011	the	openness	of	
the	Greek	economy	increased	only	slightly	(see	Böwer	et	al	2014	for	a	report	on	the	missing	Greek	
exports),	but	the	sectoral	structure	of	exports	changed	drastically.		Water	transport	dominated	Greek	
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exports,	with	42.1%	of	all	exports	originating	from	this	sector.		The	main	contributor	to	the	greatly	
increased	unevenness	is	the	water	transport	sector.		Greece	is	the	most	important	player	in	maritime	
transport	in	the	world,	it	controls	16.2%	of	global	water	transport	capacities.		As	the	export	share	of	
water	transport	increased	dramatically	(from	16.0%	to	42.1%),	its	share	in	domestic	inputs	did	not	
follow	this	increase	(share	in	domestic	intermediate	inputs	increased	from	2.1%	to	9.1%).		In	absolute	
nominal	terms	the	amount	of	exports	from	the	water	transport	sector	increased	from	1527	million	USD	
to	17	905	million	USD	(an	eleven-fold	increase),	while	domestic	intermediate	inputs	from	other	sectors	
increased	from	631	million	USD	to	1952	million	USD	(a	threefold	increase).		The	main	domestic	inputs	to	
this	sector	come	from	other	transport	services,	which	include	cargo	handling,	storage,	and	transport	
agency	services.		
	
	 	
Figure	11:	Greek	sectors	in	1995	and	2001,	ranked	by	upstream	domestic	embedding	(UDE).	
	
Ireland	
In	many	respects	Ireland	is	the	exact	opposite	of	Greece:	The	trajectory	of	Ireland	is	dominated	by	
increasing	openness,	with	a	first	phase	where	unevenness	increases	slightly	(between	1995	and	2001	
uneveness	increasesd	from	0.075	to	0.107),	and	a	second	phase	where	unevenness	stays	around	0.070	
(from	2002	to	2011).			
	
	 	 	
Figure	12:	Ireland	sectors	in	1995,	2001	and	2001,	ranked	by	upstream	domestic	embedding	(UDE).	
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The	major	growth	of	the	Irish	economy	from	the	nineties	was	fueled	by	a	great	influx	of	foreign	direct	
investmemnt	into	high	technology	manufacturing	and	services	(Kirby	2010,	Kirby	at	al	2010).		Over	the	
years	of	the	nineties	and	two	thousands	Ireland	became	a	hub	for	electronics	companies.		As	Figure	12	
shows,	electronics	was	the	largest	contributor	to	the	unevenness	of	the	economy:	it	contributed	to	
25.6%	of	exports,	while	it	used	only	5.7%	of	domestic	intermediate	inputs,	and	it	used	19.8%	of	all	
imports.			The	unevenness	of	the	economy	increased	slighlty	to	2001,	with	the	electronics	sector	further	
increasing	its	export	share	to	29.0%,	with	a	7.9%	share	of	domestic	intermedaite	inputs,	and	the	
chemical	industry	drastically	increasing	its	export	share	from	15.1%	to	24.7%,	while	its	domestic	
usptream	share	increased	from	3.9%	to	8.1%.			
The	unevenness	of	the	Irish	ecnomy	decreased	from	2001	to	2011,	partly	due	to	changes	in	the	weight	
of	sectors,	and	partly	due	to	changes	within	sectors.		The	export	share	and	unevenness	of	the	
electronics	sector	decreased	drastically:	the	export	share	decreased	from	29.0%	to	10.5%,	while	the	
setor’s	share	from	domestic	inputs	declreased	much	less	(from	7.9	to	5.6%).		Overall,	the	distribution	of	
export	shares	become	more	even,	and	chemical	products	became	the	top	export	share	sector.		The	
nature	of	the	electronics	sector	seems	to	have	changed	as	well:	whreas	in	1995	this	sector	mostly	used	
inputs	from	wholesale	and	retail,	by	2011	the	weight	of	equipment	renting,	chemical	products,	
metallurgy,	and	utilities	increased	significantly.		The	sector	switched	from	simple	assembly	to	a	deeper	
itnegration	with	domestic	sectors,	and	re-oriented	towards	healthcare	equiment	manufacturing.		In	
sum,	the	Irish	trajectory	switched	from	a	parallel	increase	of	openness	and	uneveness	to	a	trajectory	
where	drastic	further	increase	in	openness	was	paired	with	a	marked	decrease	in	unevenness.		
	
Trajectories	in	the	East	
Trajectories	in	the	East	region	of	the	EU	are	more	varied	and	complex,	than	the	trajectories	in	the	Core	
and	GIPS	regions.		As	our	pooled	time	series	model	of	distance	traversed	indicated,	East	economies	
experienced	larger	jumps	from	one	year	to	the	next	–	as	it	is	apparent	on	Figure	13.		
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Figure	13:	Trajectories	of	economies	in	the	space	of	openness	and	unevenness;	by	region.	Framed	area	
within	the	GIPS	chart	indicates	area	of	Core	and	East	charts.	Red	hues	indicate	significant	positive	slope,	
blue	hues	indicate	significant	negative	slopes.	Gray	hues	indicate	insignificant	slopes.		
	
The	longest	trajectory	is	the	Hungarian	one,	with	a	marked	increase	of	both	openness	and	unevenness	
in	the	first	part	(between	1995	and	2004),	followed	by	a	turning	point,	onto	a	trajectory	of	increasing	
openness	with	decreasing	unevenness.		We	label	this	a	‘turning	point	trajectory’	–	a	pattern	followed	by	
Poland	as	well	(to	the	left	of	the	Hungarian	trajectory).		There	is	a	second	kind	of	trajectory	as	well,	that	
start	with	increasing	openness	and	unevenness,	and	then	turns	back,	with	decreasing	openness	and	
unevenness.		We	label	this	a	‘retrograde	trajectory’.		Figure	14	separates	trajectories	in	the	East	accruing	
to	these	two	patterns.		
Hungary	best	exemplifies	the	turning	point	trajectory,	with	Czech	Republic,	Poland,	and	Lithuania	in	the	
same	category.		This	trajectory	suggests	a	structural	adjustment	to	increasing	openness,	a	change	to	a	
path	where	an	increased	embedding	of	export	sectors	into	the	domestic	intermediate	sectoral	flows	
becomes	possible.			
Estonia	is	the	best	example	of	the	retrograde	trajectory,	with	Bulgaria,	Latvia,	Romania,	Slovakia,	and	
Slovenia	also	in	the	same	category.		This	trajectory	suggests	a	kind	of	change,	where	the	domestic	
embedding	improves	not	by	increasing	flows	inside,	but	by	decreasing	flows	with	the	outside	world.			
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Note:	Trajectories	are	not	drawn	to	the	same	scale.	
Figure	14:	Types	of	trajectories	of	East	European	economies.		
	
Hungary	
The	Hungarian	economy	experienced	the	greatest	amount	of	change	of	any	East	European	economies,	
in	terms	of	openness	and	unevenness.		Interestingly,	the	most	even	economy	in	our	entire	dataset	was	
the	Hungarian	economy	in	1995.		As	the	first	panel	of	Figure	15	shows,	sectors	in	the	Hungarian	
economy	in	1995	had	very	similar,	and	evenly	distributed	export	shares.		None	of	the	sectors	had	an	
export	share	exceeding	10%,	and	the	sector	with	the	highest	export	share	–	Food	–	was	actually	over-
embedded	in	domestic	upstream	flows	(this	sector	was	responsible	for	9.1%	of	all	exports,	and	used	
14.9%	of	all	intermediate	flows).		The	sector	with	the	second	highest	export	share	–	Metallurgy	–	was	
the	most	uneven	of	all	sectors,	with	8.5%	of	exports	and	3.2%	of	domestic	upstream	flows.			
This	even	sectoral	structure	changed	drastically	over	the	next	ten	years.		By	2004	the	Hungarian	
economy	became	highly	uneven.		The	sector	mostly	responsible	for	this	is	Electronics:	by	2004	this	
sector	was	responsible	for	32.9%	of	all	exports,	used	28.4%	of	all	imports,	but	only	used	6.1%	of	
domestic	sectoral	output.		By	2001	Hungary	was	responsible	for	half	of	all	electronics	exports	from	
Eastern	Europe.		A	key	example	of	the	kind	of	electronics	operations	responsible	for	this	is	IBM	Storage	
Products:	an	assembly	plant	of	computer	hard	drives,	started	operating	in	1996.	By	the	end	of	the	
nineties	this	company	became	the	second	largest	exporter.		In	2002	IBM	decided	to	close	the	assembly	
operation,	and	consolidate	hard	drive	assembly	in	Asia.		The	second	sector	that	contributed	to	
unevenness	in	2004	was	the	manufacturing	of	transport	equipment.		This	sector	gave	13.9%	of	all	
exports,	using	11.1%	of	all	imports,	and	using	4.1%	of	domestic	intermediate	output.		
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Figure	15:	Hungary	sectors	in	1995,	2004	and	2011,	ranked	by	upstream	domestic	embedding	(UDE).	
	
What	was	the	nature	of	the	turning	point	after	2004?		By	2011	the	list	of	five	least	domestically	
embedded	sectors	did	not	change	much	–	only	the	ordering	of	the	third,	fourth,	and	fifth	sectors.		
Electronics	and	transport	equipment	are	still	the	sectors	responsible	for	the	highest	share	of	exports,	
although	their	share	decreased:	from	32.9%	to	21.7%	for	electronics,	and	from	13.9%	to	13.5%	for	
transport	equipment.		Electronics	changed	the	most:	the	marked	decrease	in	the	export	share	was	
paired	with	a	minor	change	in	the	proportion	of	domestic	output	used	(from	6.1%	to	5.9%).		A	sign	of	
switching	away	from	simple	assembly	is	the	increasing	amount	of	output	used	from	the	domestic	
machinery	sector.		(In	2004	2.1%	of	all	intermediate	inputs	to	electronics	came	from	domestic	
machinery	sector,	while	in	2011	this	proportion	was	19.9%.)		While	the	export	share	of	the	transport	
equipment	sector	decreased	slightly	(from	13.9%	to	13.5%),	its	share	in	domestic	inputs	used	increased	
(from	4.1%	to	5.6%).		Much	of	this	increase	was	due	to	the	rise	in	the	share	of	the	machinery	sector	out	
of	all	domestic	sectoral	inputs	(this	share	increased	from	9.5%	to	40.0%).		
	
Estonia	
Estonia	is	an	example	for	a	retrograde	trajectory	–	an	economy	that	started	to	become	more	open	and	
uneven,	and	then	both	openness	and	unevenness	declined.		Estonia	was	seen	as	a	key	example	of	an	
institutional	restructuring	success	in	the	nineties	and	early	two	thousands	(Bohle	and	Greskovits	2012).		
The	case	of	Estonia	is	marked	by	an	increase	in	openness	mostly	due	to	FDI-led	electronics	production,	
then	an	extreme	decline	during	the	2008-2009	economic	crisis.		In	2008	Estonian	GDP	declined	by	5.1%,	
then	in	2009	it	declined	by	13.9%.			
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Figure	16:	Estonia	sectors	in	1995,	2004	and	2011,	ranked	by	upstream	domestic	embedding	(UDE).	
	
The	increase	in	openness	and	unevenness	was	mostly	driven	by	the	electronics	sector,	as	Figure	16	
shows.		While	in	1995	this	sector	gave	only	5.1%	of	exports,	and	used	1.2%	of	domestic	intermediate	
inputs,	in	2004	it	gave	23.0%	of	exports,	and	used	only	0.9%	of	domestic	input.		The	size	of	the	
electronics	sector	is	much	below	the	size	of	Hungarian	electronics	–	total	electronics	exports	from	
Estonia	were	never	larger	than	6%	of	the	total	electronics	exports	from	Hungary.		The	output	of	the	
sector	came	from	a	handful	of	companies	(mostly	from	Ericsson),	and	depended	on	Scandinavian	export	
markets.		By	2011	the	export	share	of	the	sector	declined	to	12.2%,	and	its	share	from	domestic	sectoral	
output	used	increased	to	2.8%.			
	
Conclusions	
European	economic	integration	resulted	in	unprecedented	growth	in	economic	openness	throughout	
the	continent.		The	economic	crisis	of	2008	and	2009	left	only	faint	dips	in	the	increasing	trend	of	
integration,	that	over	a	decade	and	a	half	increased	by	fifty	percent.		Yet,	there	has	been	a	dramatic	
unevenness	in	the	growth	of	economic	openness,	with	Northern	Europe,	Ireland	and	the	Visegrad	group	
being	the	leaders	in	the	internationalization	of	their	sectoral	flows	and	Southern	Europe,	Baltics	and	
Balkans	experiencing	lower	than	average	integration,	with	even	a	decrease	in	sectoral	economic	
openness	in	Estonia	and	Latvia.			An	exclusive	attention	to	flows	between	national	economies	would	
miss	however	a	key	dimension	of	increasing	integration:	the	impact	of	openness	on	the	domestic	
structure	of	economies	and	the	extent	to	which	integration	is	embedded	in	the	domestic	flows.		
The	core	of	the	core	–	Germany,	Great	Britain,	Sweden,	Austria	–	are	economies	that	can	increase	their	
participation	in	transnational	flows	and	at	the	same	time	let	their	domestic	sectors	benefit	twice:	once	
as	exporters,	and	twice	as	suppliers	of	other	sectors	that	are	exporters.		The	domestic	sectoral	
hinterland	grows	with	the	flagship	export	sectors,	in	a	virtuous	circle	of	growth.		German	export	sectors	
–	primarily	exporting	sophisticated	transport	equipment,	machinery,	electronics	and	chemical	products	
–	rely	on	other	sophisticated	domestic	products,	with	sectors	innovating	and	learning	together.		
Then	there	are	regions	–	Eastern	Europe	and	Greece	–	where	this	does	not	seem	to	be	the	rule.		In	the	
East,	as	a	main	trend,	exporting	means	disconnecting.		Export	is	concentrated	in	sectors	that	are	
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assembling	imports,	and	rely	little	on	other	domestic	sectors.		A	whole	sector	can	be	built	up	quickly,	
and,	because	domestic	inputs	does	not	bind	the	sector,	can	be	moved	overnight	to	another	continent.		
Beyond	focusing	on	trends,	we	also	focus	on	trajectories.		The	first	finding	here	is	that	the	trajectories	in	
the	East	show	more	volatility	than	the	trajectories	in	the	core.		As	the	trajectories	tell,	the	increase	in	
unevenness	with	increasing	openness	in	the	East	is	not	a	linear	trend	–	there	are	signs	for	turning	points.		
Economies	in	Eastern	Europe	will	not	be	heading	down	a	disembedding	path	indefinitely	–	we	haven’t	
found	a	trajectory	type	for	a	truly	vicious	circle.	(Maybe	Greek	and	the	Czech	trajectories	come	close.)		
In	the	East	economies	are	experiencing	a	turning	point.		Partly	due	to	opportunities	opened	by	the	2008	
crisis,	export	sectors	are	growing	domestic	roots,	and	well	embedded	domestic	sectors	start	accessing	
export	markets.		Hungary,	Poland,	and	Lithuania	seem	to	switch	over	to	a	path	similar	to	the	core.		
Contrary	to	the	expectations	of	either	the	optimistic	vision	of	integration	as	convergence,	or	the	
pessimistic	idea	of	structural	reproduction	of	the	peripheral	status,	our	findings	thus	show	that	
combining	openness	with	domestic	embeddedness	is	indeed	possible,	and	it	is	not	predetermined	by	
the	initial	status	of	the	economy	as	a	core	or	a	peripheral	one.	While	the	Hungarian	or	the	Polish	
trajectories	suggest	that	the	pathway	towards	the	core	is	possible	in	the	periphery,	the	French	trajectory	
suggests	that	core	countries	are	not	immune	to	disembedding	either.	Developmental	pathways,	rather	
than	being	merely	the	result	of	the	structural	starting	conditions	are	rather	always	shaped	by	the	
developmental	agency.	Furthermore,	we	find	important	intra-peripheral	national	variation	in	
developmental	pathways,	similar	to	the	one	discussed	by	Bohle	and	Greskovits	(2012).		Our	results	thus	
suggest	that	at	least	with	respect	to	trade	flows,	the	developmental	implications	of	increased	openness	
may	be	primarily	the	result	of	domestic	developmental	agency,	rather	than	the	supranational	one	(see	
Bruszt	and	Vukov	introduction	to	this	issue	on	supranational	developmental	agency).	
Further	research	is	needed	to	identify	the	impact	of	unevenness	on	other	developmental	outcomes.		
This	article	aimed	at	highlighting	an	inequality	that	we	have	theoretical	reasons	to	expect	to	be	
connected	to	underdevelopment,	but	we	have	not	analyzed	these	outcomes	here.		There	are	several	
hypotheses	that	need	to	be	investigated	–	for	example,	is	there	an	optimal	value	for	unevenness	that	is	
not	zero?		Are	there	trade-offs,	where	decreasing	unevenness	is	related	to,	for	example,	increasing	
unemployment?		We	should	also	investigate	the	limits	of	growing	unevenness,	and	also	decreasing	
unevenness.		What	are	the	limits	for	the	Greek	economy	in	terms	of	the	domestic	disembedding	of	
export	sectors?		How	far	can	the	German	economy	develop	by	increasing	openness	and	reducing	
unevenness?		Our	goal	in	this	article	was	to	highlight	these	inequalities,	using	the	new	perspective	that	
the	WIOD	dataset	offers	with	transnational	input-output	flows.		
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